Schmitt’s conceptualisation of the political is
obviously rooted in the ontological conflict between the dichotomic distinction
of friend and enemy. That which should clearly be considered as having an
ontological basis does oddly enough derive basically from the dialectical
reciprocity of what the political is as such. According to Schmitt (1995, p.
37), “The political does not reside in the battle itself, which possesses its own
technical, psychological, and military laws, but in the mode of behaviour which
is determined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete situation
and thereby being able to distinguish correctly the real friend and the real
enemy.” This explication of Schmitt directly gives us some tips about the
question of durability of the possibility of war and, moreover, the inquiry of
the durability or stability of the distinction between the friend-enemy
grouping. The point is, according to Schmitt’s vantage point, neither the
infinity of the friend-enemy grouping, nor does it settle itself in
depoliticalisation of the modern understanding of the state as a reflection of
the era. In this context, Schmitt baldly follows the traces of earthly ‘sedentarisation’
of the oncept of the political, which does mainly afford to found itself as a
semipermeable limitedness, and, not to appear as an absolute. It seems,
therefore, to turn out to be that which appears in any sphere might easily be
ended in sphere of the concept the political referring to friend-enemy
grouping. Thus, being ontological for the concept of the political does never
mean that it is unattainable (unerreichbar) and unchangeable in terms of
its running away from political orientation. Other spheres such as economic,
religious, cultural, scientific, legal etc. cannot become the political itself,
as it is almost never encompassed by them; rather than this, what we should put
in this claim on this occasion is that which is nothing other than the
political is the absolute destination of those other spheres. As far as we
understand Schmitt’s point of view, political entity is doubtlessly the
decisive entity for the friend-enemy grouping, and it is probably the total
state defining the way in which society inevitably gets embedded in the
political, in which the state does eventually becomes an authoritative state
reigning over its area. As Schmitt (1995, p. 43) realistically claims, “The
political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the
sources from which it derives its last psychic motives. It exists or does not
exist. If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the
authoritative entity.”
Liberalists, according to Schmitt’s terminology, are
those who easily propound the neutralisation and depoliticalisation of the
state in regard to its role of being deciive entity. What it does mean is
basically that liberalists’ views in general destroys the decisive position of
the state and throws it into the abyss of indeterminatedness in which
friend-enemy grouping of the concept of the political crucially turns into the
possibility of private war, or better, it is again and again transferred to the
political absolutely.
Another feature of the state is its being entitled to
decide jus belli (law of war), as Schmitt (1995, p. 46) depicts, “The
state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power: the
possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men.
The jus belli contains such a disposition. It implies a double
possibility: the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and
unhesitatingly to kill enemies.” This sentence seems to be affected by Hegel’s
realistic political philosophy. Declaration of war does necessarily imply the
freedom of the state, giving the norm its concrete content, deciding for itself
in terms of givenness of it in the concrete case, and the approval that the war
cannot altogether be outlawed.
Schmitt defines two types of plurality which are
differentiated through the effectiveness of the state. On the one hand, the
liberalist understanding conceives of the state as a negative organisation and
strives to limit it to an organisation protecting merely the individual
interests; however, the state does, on the other hand, refer to at least two
different states around the world. Unlike liberalist conceptualisation of the
concept of plurality, Schmitt poses the plurality of states as the necessary
condition of the political; otherwise, that is, in the absence of plurality of
states, it is impossible to think of the friend-enemy grouping as the essence
of politics, as the necessary result of being ‘human’ having by its nature the
evil.
REFERENCE
Schmitt, C., (1995), The Concept of the Political,
[Tr. George Schwab], London: The University of Chicago Press.
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