SCHMITT’S AND CLAUSEWITZ’S VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF WAR

In any sense, submerging into the concept of the war might straightforwardly be understood as a reflection on the structure of decision-making process of the political entity. According to Schmitt, the war should absolutely be considered through the distinctive feature of the political entity, through that that which is the decisive character of the political entity is nothing but the jus belli of it. In this context, the jus belli directly refers to the decisiveness of the political entity in regard to determining the limits of the concept of the war. Literal explanation of the jus belli is the law of the war and peace (jus belli ac pacis). Thus, when we think about the concept of the political entity, then, we have to focus much more on its decisive act than any of its approaches to the world, or better, of its relations with the world. That which might barely be found as gory as the death is absolutely the power, or right, of the political entity to have its citizens to call for a war in regard to its realistic structure. As Schmitt (1995, p. 47) does frankly announces, “The authority to decide, in the form of a verdict on life and death, the jus vitae ac necis, can also belong to another non-political order within the political entity, for instance, to the family or to the head of household, but not the right of a hostis declaration as long as the political entity is an actuality and possesses the jus belli. If a political entity exists at all, the right of vendettas between families or kinfolk would have to be suspended at least temporarily during a war.”[1] The structure of the war is, therefore, directly bound up with political entity’s explanation of ‘the state of exception’.[2]

Schmitt and Clausewitz are prone to take the condition of the war as one of the possible ways of politics seriously. It is totally about the condition in which the political entity has to retain its existence. As Schmitt (1995, p. 53) clarifies it, “If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.”[3] This kind of understanding turns out to be the common view of Clausewitz and Schmitt. Their views on the war seems to be likely to follow Hegel’s views on this issue, that is, that the war cannot mean the end of enmity implying the grouping of political entities regarding the political. Kardeş (2015, p. 78) asserts that the common approach of Schmitt and Clausewitz is nothing other than the concept of the war as a means of the political. In this sense, as Clausewitz (2007, p. 13) clearly puts it, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”[4] What it does mean is actually nothing but that the political root of the war is the political friend-enemy grouping of political entities. Moreover, it is quite reasonable to think that the war is the continuation of the political decision-making in the battlefield, that is, that the war does not need to comprise a rational or idealist thought, rather, what it involves in itself is obviously nothing but the ontological and necessary condition of the political entity, a condition which plainly derives from friend-enemy grouping of those entities. According to Kardeş (2015, p. 80), this politicalisation of the war does definitely serve for the common views of those political thinkers.

REFERENCE

Clausewitz, C. v., (2003), Vom Kriege, Erftstadt: Area Verlag.

Clausewitz, C. v., (2007), On War, [Tr. Michael Howard & Peter Paret], Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kardeş, M. E., (2015), Schmitt’le Birlikte Schmitt’e Karşı – Politik Felsefe Açısından Carl Schmitt ve Düşüncesi, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Schmitt, C., (1979), Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin: Dunkel & Humblot.

Schmitt, C., (1995), The Concept of the Political, [Tr. George Schwab], London: The University of Chicago Press.

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[1] “Die Befugnis, in der Form eines Strafurteils über Leben und Tod eines Menschen zu verfügen, das jus vitae ac necis, kann auch einer anderen, innerhalb der politischen Einheit bestehenden Verbindung, etwa der Familie oder dem Familienhaupt zustehen, nicht aber, solange die politische Einheit als solche vorhanden ist, das jus belli oder das Recht der hostis-Erklärung. Auch ein Recht der Blutrache zwischen den Familien oder Sippen müßte wenigstens während eines Krieges suspendiert werden, ween überhaupt eine politische Einheit bestellen soll.” (Schmitt, 1979).

[2] Der Ausnahmezustand.

[3] “Dadurch, daß ein Volk nicht mehr die Kraft oder den Willen hat, sich in der Sphäre des Politischen zu halten, verschwindet das Politische nicht aus der Welt. Es verschwindet nur ein schwaches Volk.” (Schmitt, 1979).

[4] Der Krieg ist also ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen.” (Clausewitz, 2003, p. 14).